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RESOLVING ALJ REMOVAL PROTECTIONS PROBLEM
FOLLOWING LUCIA
Spencer Davenport*

ABSTRACT
When the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC and held that administrative
law judges (ALJs) are Officers under the Constitution, the Court opened a flood of
constitutional issues around the status of ALJs and related government positions.
One central issue relates to ALJs’ removal protections. ALJs currently have two
layers of protection between them and the President. In an earlier Supreme Court
decision, the Court held that two layers of tenure protection between an “Officer of
the United States” and the President was unconstitutional as it deprived the
President the power to hold his officers accountable. As impartial adjudicators,
ALJs need those layers of protection to ensure fair adjudicative hearings. Lucia
now threatens ALJ protections. This Note argues that implementing a peremptory
challenge system which would allow each party in an adjudicative hearing to
remove the ALJ from hearing its case would create an avenue in which the Court
could justify the removal issue. Such a proposal would fix executive oversight
concerns about the President being unable to properly implement his policy.
Additionally, peremptory challenges would allow litigants in front of an agency be
able to remove ALJs they feel are predisposed to the agency. By addressing both
constitutional issues, the Court may be more likely to find that the two layers of
tenure protection in place are permissible for those in adjudicatory positions.
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INTRODUCTION
In a term with decisions impacting immigration, 1 voting, 2 and pri3
vacy rights, there might not have been a more important Supreme
4
Court decision in 2018 than Lucia v. SEC. In the end, Lucia won his
claim as the Court found that the administrative law judges (ALJs) of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) qualify as “Officers”
of the United States and are subject to the Appointments Clause of
5
the United States Constitution. Prior to the ruling, SEC staff, not
the SEC’s presidentially appointed commissioners, hired the SEC’s
6
ALJs and considered them only ordinary federal “employees.” The

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)
Lucia v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
Id. at 2047.
Id. at 2051.
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Court’s ruling meant that SEC ALJs must be appointed in the future
7
by the President, “Courts of Law,” or “Heads of Departments.”
At first glance, Lucia seems like a case that only those in the financial industry would care about. The Court narrowly confined its
decision to SEC ALJs and the case involved an agency function that
involved an agency function about which many Americans are unaware. Nonetheless, it only took a few weeks for the Supreme Court’s
opinion to have consequences within the agency adjudication system.
On July 10, 2018, President Trump signed an executive order
which moved ALJ hiring from the competitive service into the excepted service. 8 President Trump issued the order to ensure that
agencies hired ALJs in a manner consistent with the Appointments
9
Clause. The decision also gave heads of agencies greater control
10
in the selection of ALJs.
Lurking alongside Lucia are questions of both policy and constitutional significance. The issue that is likely most significant is that ALJ
removal protections may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
earlier decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
11
Oversight Board. In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court held that dual forcause limitations on removal violated the President’s supervisory authority over executive branch officers. 12 ALJs also have two layers of
protection in place, as they can only be dismissed for good cause by
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), whose members
themselves are protected, as the President may remove them only
13
for enumerated reasons. To comply with the Court’s holding in
Free Enterprise Fund, one layer of for-cause ALJ protection needs to be

7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
8. Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018). Excepted service positions are positions that are “excepted” from the rules governing the hiring of competitive service. See Hiring Information, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/hiringinformation/excepted-service/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020). For competitive service positions,
individuals must go through a hiring process which is open to all applicants. Id. Excepted service positions allow agencies to have their own hiring systems and evaluation criteria. Id.
9. See Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018).
10. See id.
11. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
12. Id. at 496.
13. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2018).
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removed. However, such a move would create serious concerns
14
about ALJ impartiality and independence.
This Note proposes a remedy that would allow parties in an administrative hearing to remove the presiding ALJ for any reason.
Permitting a “peremptory challenge” of ALJs would resolve executive branch supervision concerns while also assuaging due process
fears related to ALJ bias. Under this system, the President and agency could remove the ALJ from a case without going through the
formal removal process of the MSPB. Private parties also could remove the ALJ from their hearing. Such a remedy would provide a
significant thumb on the scale for the Supreme Court to keep ALJ
dual-layer removal protection.
Part I of this Note provides background on ALJs and describes
their status following Lucia and the Court’s earlier decision in Free
Enterprise Fund. Part II describes how these decisions make ALJ removal protections unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause
and how constitutional issues of executive oversight and due process
arise from Lucia. In Part III, this Note examines several proposed solutions and assesses their viability. Ultimately, these proposed solutions do not adequately address executive supervision concerns and
ALJ independence concerns. Finally, Part IV proposes that peremptory challenges would address Appointments Clause concerns in Lucia and Free Enterprise Fund, while also addressing executive oversight
and due process concerns.
I.

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF ALJS AND LUCIA

Part I begins with an overview of the role of ALJs, their selection,
and removal. This Part then discusses the Lucia decision and ALJs’
new designation as Article II officers. As discussed below, President
Trump’s subsequent executive order following Lucia poses a risk to
ALJs’ impartiality. Finally, Part I examines the President’s removal
power since Free Enterprise Fund, in which the Court held that two
layers of removal protection of executive officers were unconstitutional. Given that ALJs also have two layers of removal protection, it
is likely that the Lucia decision makes their removal process unconstitutional.

14. Kent Barnett, Resolve the “ALJ Quandary”: Let the D.C. Circuit Appoint and Remove ALJs.
YALE J. ON REG. (Jan. 2, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/resolve-the-alj-quandary-let-the-d-ccircuit-appoint-and-remove-aljs-by-kent-barnett/.
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A. Congress Enacted Protections to
Keep ALJs Independent from their Agency
An ALJ is a judge and trier of fact who presides over formal adju15
dicatory and rulemaking proceedings for administrative agencies.
ALJs oversee all formal administrative adjudications under the Ad16
ministrative Procedure Act (APA). ALJs adjudicate claims ranging
from providing Medicaid benefits to issuing professional licenses to
17
making decisions on environmental violations.
Recognizing that ALJs preside over important cases imposing significant consequences on regulated parties, Congress accorded ALJs
18
statutory protections guaranteeing their decisional independence.
19
Although each federal agency is responsible for selecting its ALJs,
agencies do not have carte blanche in their selection. Instead, they
must follow standards that the Office of Personnel Management
20
(OPM) create. OPM’s hiring guidelines require ALJ candidates to
21
be lawyers with at least seven years of experience. OPM then gives
candidates a score based on experience, recommendations, and a
22
written and oral examination. After the scores are tabulated, the
OPM provides agencies with a list of three qualified ALJs, from
23
which the agency chooses.
Once selected, ALJs are afforded certain statutory protections
keeping them independent from the agency. The APA provides that
ALJs are exempt from evaluations and bonuses, which supports the
thinking that independent arbitrators should not be able to receive
24
bonuses from their agencies for their decisions. Nor are ALJs subject to the supervision of employees or agents of the agency who
25
work in an investigatory or prosecutorial function.

15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57 (2018).
16. Id. (detailing requirements for formal rulemaking and adjudication).
17. Lisa Needam, How a Brand-New Executive Order Could Seat Judges Who Are Eager to Deny
Immigrant Rights, REWIRE.NEWS (July 11, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/07/11/howa-brand-new-executive-order-could-seat-judges-who-are-eager-to-deny-immigrants-rights/.
18. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57 (2018).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2018).
20. VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES:
AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010).
21. Hon. John C. Holmes, Becoming a U.S. Administrative Law Judge, in CAREERS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 121 (American Bar Association, 2010).
22. Id. (describing that the OPM sends out questionnaires to at least “adversaries, judges,
or others affiliated with cases and legal work”).
23. Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797 (2013). Alternatively,
agencies could bypass the OPM process and hire an ALJ directly from another agency. Holmes,
supra note 21.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2018).
25. Id.
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Most importantly, ALJs have absolute immunity from liability for
26
their judicial acts and are “insulated from political influence.” This
27
means that ALJs can only be removed for “good cause.” Moreover,
while agencies initiate the removal of ALJs, agencies cannot themselves remove ALJs. Instead, ALJs are removable only for cause
28
which must be established and determined by the MSPB, whose
members also enjoy “good cause” removal protection from the Pres29
ident. Congress implemented these protections because of the
concern that hearing examiners “were mere tools of the agency
concerned and subservient to the agency heads” in deciding cases. 30
In theory, these protections bolsters ALJs’ independence and im31
partiality. However, ALJ independence is now threatened by the
Court’s recent decision in Lucia.
B. Lucia Designated ALJs as Officers of the United States
Raymond J. Lucia was a financial advisor who marketed a retire32
ment savings strategy called “Buckets of Money.” The SEC charged
33
Lucia with violating the Investment Advisers Act, alleging that he
offered misleading information to prospective clients about his in34
vestment strategy. After the hearings, SEC ALJ Cameron Elliot
concluded that Lucia had violated the Act and imposed a $300,000
penalty on him. Worse, Lucia received a lifetime ban from partici35
pating in the investment industry.
Lucia appealed, arguing that the SEC’s ALJs are “Officers” of the
United States and must be appointed by the President, “Courts of
36
Law,” or “Heads of Departments.” Since SEC department staff
hired Elliot, Lucia argued that Elliot lacked the constitutional au-

26. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 513 (1978) (hinting that ALJs had enough impartiality as they held absolute judicial immunity “functionally comparable” to judges).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018).
28. Id.
29. Bandimere v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 844 F.3d 1168, 1191 (10th Cir. 2016) (Briscoe, J., concurrence)
30. Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953).
31. But see Barnett, supra note 23, at 807 (noting that the good cause standard that governs MSPB proceedings has been criticized as it has permitted removal for absence over extended periods, declining to set hearing dates, and having a “high rate of significant adjudicatory errors.”).
32. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 832 F.3d 277, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
overruled by Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
33. 54 STAT. 789, 847, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2018) (monitoring those who advise people,
pension funds, and institutions on investment manners).
34. Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 832 F.3d at 290.
35. Id. at 283.
36. Id.
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thority to do his job. Both the SEC and D.C. Circuit rejected his argument, reasoning that SEC ALJs were “mere employees” with re38
sponsibilities that fell outside of the Appointments Clause.
In December 2016, Bandimere v. SEC, a Tenth Circuit case,
reached the opposite conclusion from the D.C. Circuit, holding
39
that SEC’s ALJs were officers under the Appointments Clause. The
court concluded that the ability to make final decisions was not dispositive and that the responsibilities of ALJs were analogous to the
officers in the Supreme Court’s 1991 ruling in Freytag v. Commissioner
40
of Internal Revenue. Since the SEC ALJ presiding over the hearing
was an inferior officer and was not constitutionally appointed, “he
held his office in violation of the Appointments Clause.” 41
When Lucia’s appeal reached the Supreme Court, Justice Kagan’s opinion for the majority sided with Lucia and the Tenth Circuit; the majority held that the SEC’s ALJs are officers of the Unit42
ed States, “subject to the Appointments Clause.” Kagan found that
the special trial judges (STJs) whom the court held to be officers in
43
Freytag were “near-carbon copies of the [SEC’s] ALJs.” Like STJs,
ALJs held a “continuing office established by law; exercise[d] significant discretion in holding adversarial hearings, and use[d] nearly
all of the same tools utilized by federal judges; and issue[d] decisions that contain factual and legal findings, and appropriate reme44
dies.” Given the characteristics of ALJs, the Court concluded that
“[i]f the Tax Court’s STJs are officers, as Freytag held, then the
45
Commission’s ALJs must be too.”
C. President Trump’s Executive Order Makes ALJ Hiring More Partisan
After Lucia, SEC ALJs are now inferior officers and must be appointed through the procedures listed in Article II of the Constitu-

37. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2050.
38. Raymond J. Lucia Cos., 832 F.3d at 283, 289.
39. Bandimere, 844 F. 3d at 1179.
40. Id. at 1179–82.
41. Id. at 1170. Following Bandimere, Lucia petitioned for rehearing en banc. The D.C.
Circuit split evenly 5–5 and issued a per curiam denying Lucia’s claim. Raymond J. Lucia Cos.
v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n , 868 F.3d 1021, 2021 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) overruled by Lucia v.
SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). Lucia petitioned for certiorari review to resolve the split between
the circuits, and the Supreme Court granted the petition.
42. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047. Interestingly, Lucia was joined by the Solicitor General who
argued that the Constitution required treatment of ALJs as officers, subject to the Appointments Clause. Anton Metlitsky, a partner at O’Melveny & Myers, filed the brief arguing that the
existing appointments of ALJs were accord with the Constitution.
43. Id. at 2052.
44. Id. at 2053.
45. Id. at 2054.
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46

tion. Though the Court limited its decision to SEC ALJs, it is likely
that the duties and responsibilities of other agency ALJs are so similar that the Court would also classify them as inferior officers. The
natural way to implement Lucia’s holding is to exempt ALJs from
the competitive selection process under the OPM and give discre47
tion to agency heads. Shortly after the Court’s decision, President
48
Trump issued an executive order effectively doing this. In the executive order, President Trump said that ALJ candidates will now be
hired based on considerations “such as work ethic, judgment, and
49
ability to meet the particular needs of the agency.” By changing the
standard, agencies have more discretion in evaluating and selecting
50
candidates that best suit the agencies’ subject-matter expertise.
The danger with the executive order is that the new hiring guidelines conceivably allow agencies to hire ALJs who are predisposed to
51
rule in favor of them. The executive order also appears to give
agency heads discretion over the need to bring in additional ALJs. 52
Under the old system, the OPM decided when federal agencies
needed new judges. 53 By cutting the OPM out of the hiring process,
the order shifts that power to agency heads who could conceivably
pack the agency with ALJs in line with the current administration’s

46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Agencies that previously delegated the power to appoint
ALJs to their staff will withdraw those delegations and will have to reappoint the same people
based on the recommendations of the staff who had previously appointed the ALJs.
47. Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (2018). But see VALERIE BRANNON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., LSB10172, CAN A PRESIDENT AMEND REGULATIONS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER?
(2018) (arguing that court precedent and the Administrative Procedures Act may significantly
limit President Trump’s executive order’s legal authority).
48. Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (2018).
49. Id.
50. Id. See also Kent Barnett, Raiding the OPM Den: The New Method of ALJ Hiring, YALE J. ON
REG. (July 11, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/raiding-the-opm-den-the-new-method-of-aljhiring-by-kent-barnett/ (arguing that the executive order may prove beneficial as it will allow
agencies to decide when they need to hire a new ALJ and that the agency can consider subjectmatter expertise, something that was not considered before under OPM).
51. See Eric Yoder, Trump Moves to Shield Administrative Law Judge Decisions in Wake of High
Court Ruling, WASH. POST (July 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
wp/2018/07/10/trump-moves-to-shield-administrative-law-judge-decisions-in-wake-of-highcourt-ruling (reporting that the American Constitution Society’s Carol Fredrickson opined that
the executive order “could have a stunning impact on how myriad administrative claims are
handled,” because “[p]olitical appointment could . . . lead to more administrative law judges
with pro-corporate anti-worker biases”; see also William Funk, Trump’s Politicization of the Administrative Judiciary, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (July 19, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/trumpspoliticization-of-the-administrative-judiciary/ (explaining that the President of the American
Bar Association wrote to members of the House of Representatives, urging legislation to prevent implementation of the executive order because of its potential to “interfere with the decisional independence of ALJs.”).
52. Barnett, supra note 50.
53. See Alison Frankel, As Trump Claims Power to Pick Federal Agency Judges, Skeptics Fear CourtPacking, REUTERS (July 11, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-alj/
as-trump-claims-power-to-pick-federal-agency-judges-skeptics-fear-court-packingidUSKBN1K12YA.
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policies. Because there is no longer a prescribed vetting process,
there is now a perception that agencies will select judges who are
sympathetic to the sitting administration’s policy preferences. Since
ALJs are supposed to be impartial and independent adjudicators,
this is obviously worrisome.
C. The President Has the Power to Remove His Officers
Which Now Includes ALJs
Though President Trump’s executive order addressed ALJ ap55
pointment, it did not address ALJ removal. While promoting ALJ
independence and impartiality through the dual-layer removal protections is certainly desirable, ALJ protections must comport with
the United States Constitution’s Article II and the separation of
powers.
Specifically, Article II confers on the President the duty to “take
56
Care” that the laws are faithfully executed. While the Constitution
does not explicitly define the President’s power to remove officers,
the Court has held that the President must be able to oversee and
supervise the officers and departments helping him perform his
duties. Thus, the President must also be able to remove officers
57
who ignore his direction.
The Supreme Court has found, however, that Congress can
58
place limits on the President’s removal power. In Morrison v. Ol59
son, the Court held that one level of for-cause removal between
the President and an inferior officer was constitutional. In 2010,
the Court addressed the question of whether more than one layer
of removal limitations restricted the President’s removal power too
60
much in Free Enterprise Fund. There, the Court examined the validity of the for-cause removal provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
54.
55.

Barnett, supra note 50.
Id. But see Andrew Hessick, Changes to the Independence of Administrative Law Judges, YALE
J. ON REG. (July 11, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/changes-to-the-independence-ofadministrative-law-judges/.
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
57. The Removal Power, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-2/28-theremoval-power.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2020). See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
(holding that the President has the exclusive power to remove executive branch officials).
58. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The Court found that the
Federal Trade Commission Act which limited the President’s power to remove an FTC member for political reasons was constitutional. The Supreme Court distinguished between executive officers and quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial officers. The Court opined that the latter may
be removed only with procedures consistent with statutory conditions enacted by Congress.
Because the FTC was a quasi-legislative body, the President could not fire an FTC member solely for political reasons.
59. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
60. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 (2010).
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Act. As part of the Act, SOX created the Public Company Ac62
counting Oversight Board (PCAOB), an administrative body
which provided independent oversight of public accounting
63
firms. Congress vested the SEC with the power to appoint and
64
remove the Board members only “for good cause shown.” In turn,
the SEC commissioners enjoyed similar protection from presiden65
tial removal. The Court found that more than one layer of limits
on the President’s removal power left the President unable to adequately exercise his constitutional duties and held the protections
unconstitutional. 66
II. ALJ REMOVAL PROTECTIONS VIOLATE THE
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Against the backdrop of Free Enterprise Fund, Lucia’s removal problem emerges. This Part explains how the Court’s decision not to
clarify the definition of an officer could jeopardize the protection
status of other agency staff. Moreover, it examines why the multilayer removal provisions protecting ALJs are unconstitutional. This
Part will show that the removal provisions present executive oversight problems as well as due process concerns. These constitutional
issues mean the current removal provisions cannot stay in place nor
can they simply be stripped away without any reform.
A. The Court’s Decision to Not Define “Significant Authority” Threatens
the Independence of Hundreds of Agency Employees
The Court’s decision to leave unexplained the meaning of “significant authority” raises the questions of who qualifies as an officer
and how far the constitutional requirement for officer appointment
extends. Significant to the majority was the fact that SEC ALJs over67
see adversarial hearings. Court jurisprudence has consistently dis68
tinguished between “adversarial and nonadversarial hearings.” The

61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 107 H.R. 3763, § 4010
(2002).
62. Pronounced “peek-a-boo.”
63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 201(g)(1)–(9).
64. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 479.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 487.
67. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049.
68. See The Supreme Court 2017 Term: Leading Case: Constitutional Law: Article II – Appointments Clause – Officers of the United States – Lucia v. SEC, 132 HARV. L. REV. 287, 294–96
(2018).
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Court’s emphasis on the adversarial nature of the hearings overseen
by SEC ALJs suggests a potential limitation on who are defined as
“Officers of the United States.”
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch, expressed support for the definition of an “Officer” to change
69
to its original public meaning. For Justices Thomas and Gorsuch,
an individual who maintains an ongoing responsibility for a task or
70
power authorized by a statute is an officer. This definition would
“encompass all federal civil officials who perform an ongoing, statutory duty—no matter how important or significant the duty.” 71 Individuals would be officers “even if they performed only ministerial
duties—including recordkeeping, clerks and tidewaiters (individuals
72
who watched goods land at a customhouse).”
Under Thomas and Gorsuch’s definition, administrative judges
(AJs), a group of government officials totaling three times the number of ALJs, would be the first group defined as officers. Though
they have less decisional independence than ALJs, they still carry out
many of the same adjudicatory functions as ALJs and occupy vital
positions within agencies as immigration judges, patent examiners,
73
or Veterans Affairs regional administrators.
In a separate opinion, Justice Breyer expressed concern about the
Court’s move towards an originalist conception of an officer in clas74
sifying ALJs as “Officers of the United States.” Breyer’s Lucia opinion builds off his dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, in which he criticized
the Court’s ruling as failing to define who qualified as an inferior of75
ficer. In that dissent, Breyer argued that without a limiting principle to the scope of the decision, “hundreds, perhaps thousands of
high-level government officials” could have their job security and
76
decisions at risk. Now, following Lucia, Breyer’s premonition seems
to be coming true. While the Free Enterprise Fund majority noted that
most federal government employees are not “Officers of the United
77
States,” Thomas and Gorsuch’s Lucia concurrence has aroused fear
about the expanding definition of an officer.
69. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70. Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 454
(2018) (opining that within the original public meaning of the definition would be tax collectors; federal law enforcement officers; officials responsible for government investigations, audits, or cleanup; and ALJs).
71. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 2057.
73. Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1657–59 (2016).
74. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2057–58 (2018) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
75. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 539–40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 506 n.9 (indicating that well over 90% of those who render services to and are
paid by the federal government are not constitutional officers).
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While expanding officer status to more agency employees may
have little effect on the appointment process, there are larger implications on the tenure status agency employees enjoy. If most agency
employees are now removable at-will, there is a justifiable fear that
independent agencies will be more partisan in their decision-making
as the President will be able to remove agency employees who were
78
supposed to be insulated from the influences of political pressure.
B. Removal Protections Raise Constitutional Issues
Though pressed by the Solicitor General to resolve the multiple
for-cause removal protections for SEC ALJs, the Court dodged the
79
issue as it is fraught with separation of powers implications. With
the current removal protections, the President lacks supervisory authority over ALJs. At the same time, ALJs’ relationship with the
agencies in which they sit creates impartiality concerns. Had the
Court decided that the ALJ removal scheme was unconstitutional,
the due process concerns would grow as it would transform ALJs
from “independent adjudicators into dependent decisionmakers, serv80
ing at the pleasure of the Commission.” Any reform to the ALJ removal scheme needs to address the competing constitutional concerns of appointment, removal, and impartiality.
1. Removal Protections Limit Presidential Supervisory Oversight
As discussed above, Article II confers on the President the ability
to oversee those who execute the laws. Given the Court’s invalidation of the two layers of removal protections in Free Enterprise Fund as
a hindrance to executive oversight, that same logic would seem to
render ALJs’ two layers of removal protection also unconstitutional.
There are some who argue that Free Enterprise Fund only applies to
officers who perform quasi-executive and quasi-legislative functions,

78. But see Mascott, supra note 70, at 563 (arguing that there is a possibility that as the definition of an officer changes, the conception of an officer will change from an inherently political position to a more neutral one because the President could not clear house every time because of the sheer amount of employees that would fall under an originalist definition of an
officer).
79. See generally Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2050 n.1. Since the founding, there have been concerns about the concentration of political power. The Framers structured the government in
order to “avoid undue concentrations of power by resort to institutional devices designed to
foster three political values: checking, diversity, and accountability.” Martin Redish & Elizabeth
Cisar, “If Angels were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41
DUKE L.J. 449, 451 (1991).
80. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2060 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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whereas ALJs exercise purely adjudicatory powers. This argument
is rooted in dicta in the decision. In a footnote, the Court noted that
their holding “does not address that subset of independent agency
employees who serve as administrative law judges. Whether administrative law judges are necessarily ‘Officers of the United States’ is
disputed. And unlike members of the Board, many administrative
law judges of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement
82
functions . . . .”
District courts have used this footnote in Free Enterprise Fund to
find that ALJ removal protections are not unconstitutional. In Duka
83
v. SEC, the Southern District of New York held that Free Enterprise
Fund did not create a “categorical rule forbidding two levels of
‘good-cause’ tenure protection.” 84 What matters is not the number
of layers of protection per se, but whether the PCAOB’s removal
scheme was so structured as to “infringe” on the President’s duty to
85
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Because the SEC’s ALJs
only perform “adjudicatory functions, and are not engaged in poli86
cymaking or enforcement,” the President’s ability to remove an
ALJ is not so fundamental to the functioning of the executive
branch as to require that the ALJ be terminable at-will by the Presi87
dent.
Reading Free Enterprise Fund this way is appealing as it brings coherence to an incoherent body of law and protects officers who solely adjudicate, such as ALJs. However, at the heart of Free Enterprise
Fund is whether the arrangement interferes with Article II’s vesting
of the executive power in the President. When it comes to the “responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” Arti81. Even before Free Enterprise Fund, some scholars argued that Wiener v. United States,
357 U.S. 349 (1958) already distinguished adjudicatory positions from executive and legislative
positions. In Wiener, the Court upheld limits on the President’s removal power for a member of
the War Claims Tribunal because Congress intended the commission to operate independently of the will of the President. In the same way, the APA reflects Congress’s intent to set up an
independent adjudicatory body apart from executive agencies. Though the President could
obtain a favorable result from an ALJ without adjudication, he could not do so under the APA.
82. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 506 n.10. Since the Court’s decision, some scholars have
found that the decision to invalidate the removal protection of PCAOB’s members “depends in
part on the combination of functions of the officials whose tenure those provisions protect.”
Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2399 (2011) (arguing that Free Enterprise Fund examines the validity of the two layers of protections by examining
different functions within the agency).
83. Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357, 2015 WL 5547463 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015).
84. Id. at *15.
85. Id. at *17.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on
other grounds and remanded by Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (expressing doubts
about the constitutionality of the SEC’s removal scheme as ALJs do not function in a solely executive position, and that the protections “do not interfere with the President’s ability to perform” his constitutional duties).
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cle II of the Constitution means that the “buck stops with the Pres88
ident.” This means that the President should still be able to oversee all officers that implement his executive power and make poli89
cy. Without the ability to oversee ALJs, the President is no longer
90
the judge of ALJ conduct. This is problematic because the people
did not vote for ALJs nor did they vote for the members of the
MSPB. With no “clear and effective chain of command,” ALJs lack
91
accountability to the public. The purpose “of the separation and
equilibration of powers in general, and of the unitary Executive in
particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to
92
preserve individual freedom.” Without presidential oversight of
ALJs, there is legitimate concern about effective governance in implementing presidential policies.
2. Removing ALJ Tenure Protections Raise Due Process Concerns
The dissenting judges in Free Enterprise Fund noted that Congress
implemented ALJ tenure protections for the purpose of “impartial
adjudication.” 93 If the current Court decides that the ALJ removal
protections are unconstitutional, there is justifiable concern about
the integrity of adjudication as presidential supervisory power expands.
Due process demands impartiality and fairness of ALJs. Even before Lucia, some scholars argued that ALJs lack independence from
94
the agencies in which they sit, and that was a due process violation.

88. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493.
89. See generally id.(removing tenure protection for inferior officers that an independent
agency appointed). Since SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), agencies have discretion
whether to proceed through rulemaking or adjudication. For example, the National Labor
Relations Boards creates policy almost exclusively through adjudication.
90. Id. at 497.
91. Id. at 498.
92. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U. S. at 522 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. See John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB.
L. 33, 54 (2002); Harold Levinson, The Status of the Administrative Judge, 38 AM. J. COMP. L.
(Supp.) 523, 537–38 (1990) (expressing uncertainty with ALJ impartiality); Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110
(1981) (describing the doubts some have around the independence of ALJs); James P. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 807,
828 (1984) (arguing that because agencies initiate removal proceedings, the removal process
calls into question the independence of ALJs); Karen Y. Kauper, Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 537, 544 (1985) (arguing that ALJs’ biases have led to poor decision-making); Jason D.
Vendel, Note, General Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is there a Remedy for Social Security Disability Claimants?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 777–86 (2005) (detailing two cases, Grant and Pronti,
that show ALJ bias). See also W. Michael Gillette, Administrative Law Judges, Judicial Independence,
and Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes, 20 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 95, 117

SPRING 2020]

Resolving ALJ Removal Protections

707

Though OPM vets ALJ candidates, the agency still picks the candidate it believes will be most sympathetic to its policies. Alternatively,
agencies can hire ALJs directly from another agency, meaning they
can choose an ALJ that they know possesses a certain policy prefer95
96
ence. Even though ex parte contact is prohibited, the fact that the
agency often serves as a party to an administrative proceeding also
97
raises questions about the impartiality of ALJs. While challenges to
98
ALJ impartiality have been unsuccessful so far, the Court’s recent
decision in Caperton tees up the issue again, especially if ALJs’ re99
moval protections are stripped.
In Caperton, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
required the recusal of a West Virginia Supreme Court Justice from
a case involving a major donor to his election campaign. The Court
100
held that actual bias was unnecessary for his recusal. Instead, the
Court indicated that the contributions constituted “extreme facts”
that created an unconstitutional “potential for bias” that could
101
“tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”
(2000) (arguing that judges need to have qualities of diligence, equality, and courage for the
public to believe in ALJs).
95. See Lubbers, supra note 94, at 117 (describing how agencies can seek “selective certification” which permits an agency to bypass the rule of three for selecting a candidate); Holmes,
supra note 21, at 121 (arguing for a creation of an ALJ corps that would allow for their independence and impartiality); see also Padro v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-1788 E.D.N.Y. (2013), in which
plaintiffs brought a class action for Social Security disability benefits that were denied by one of
five Administrative Law Judges in Queens. Under the settlement, approximately 4,000 individuals denied disability benefits will be entitled to receive new hearings.
96. 24 C.F.R. § 180.215 (2018).
97. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
21, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints1413849590 (finding that during the fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the SEC prevailed in 90% and
100% of trials before ALJs. In front of Article III judges, the SEC prevailed 75% and 63% of the
time, respectively. But see Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315 (2017); Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul?: SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform Through Removal Legislation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143
(2016). Both Velikonja and Grundfest argue that there was no robust evidence to support the
contention that the SEC was more likely to prevail in enforcement actions decided by ALJs
than in similar actions decided by federal judges. They argue that the disparity is due to the
different characteristics of cases filed in each type of forum.
98. Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that the claimant’s interests
were adequately protected by the ad hoc panel that was convened by the agency to investigate
an ALJ). But see id. at 1355 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (arguing that the agency procedure
“was not established by regulation or statute; it lacked any procedural rules . . .”).
99. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). In Caperton, the defendant
A.T. Massey Coal Company was found liable for $50 million in damages. While the case was
being appealed, Don Blankenship, the CEO of A.T. Massey, contributed three million dollars
to have Justice Benjamin elected to West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Despite recusal
motions from plaintiffs, Justice Benjamin declined to recuse himself, claiming that he had no
actual bias. Justice Benjamin was ultimately part of the 3-2 majority that overturned the verdict.
See also Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (concluding there was a Due Process
violation when Pennsylvania’s chief justice failed to recuse himself in a case involving a prisoner he had prosecuted).
100. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883.
101. Id. at 878, 887.
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Though the Court cabined its decision within the context of judicial elections, Caperton bolsters scholars’ claims that hearings in front
of ALJs are unfair and violate the due process of private parties. The
implications of Caperton feel especially important following Lucia. If
ALJs lose one of their two layers of removal protection, there are two
possible outcomes: first, either ALJs will become removable at-will by
the MSPB; alternatively, ALJs will retain their for-cause protections
from the MSPB, but the President could remove the MSPB members
at-will. Either way, ALJs will be at risk of being “discharged at the
102
whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons.” The agency’s greater role in selecting and removing ALJs would now be more
direct than the judge in Caperton because they can directly choose
the ALJ, are parties in front of them, and then can remove them.
The agency’s entanglement with the supposedly independent ALJ
raises substantial due process concerns.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE APPOINTMENT AND
REMOVAL OF ALJS
A solution to ALJ appointment and removal must balance ALJ independence and due process concerns while resolving the President’s need for supervisory control over his executive branch officers. Some popular proposals, discussed below, include changing the
standard of good cause removal, creating an ALJ corps, and even
moving the appointment and removal power to Article III courts.
Ultimately, each of these proposals is inadequate for either failing
to resolve one of the constitutional problems, or for being politically infeasible.
A. Removing MSPB’s For-Cause Layer of Tenure Protection
The simplest solution would be to have the Court find that the
two layers of ALJ removal protection is unconstitutional and remove
one of the layers. Most likely, the MSPB members would become
removable at-will, while ALJs would maintain their for-cause removal
103
layer between them and the MSPB. This solution resolves Free Enterprise Fund’s removal issue while also providing the President more
oversight of his officers.

102. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conf., 345 U.S. 128,142 (1953).
103. Since the focus is on maintaining the independence of ALJs, it is likely that they would
receive the most protection and the MSPB would receive less stringent protections.
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At first glance, it also appears that changing the MSPB layer of
protection would not have deleterious effects on ALJ decisionmaking because ALJs would still have a for-cause layer between them
and the MSPB. However, the two layers of for-cause removal protection may be more meaningful than many believe. Since 2006, the
MSPB has only brought a total of twenty-four removal actions against
104
105
ALJs. Of those, the MSPB has removed five of the subject ALJs.
While the total number of removal actions taken by agencies is unknown, the figure is surely higher than the number of claims
brought by the MSPB. The value of the two layers of protection is
clear especially considering the Solicitor General’s Lucia brief, in
which he argued that agencies are often unable to properly sanction
106
ALJs when they violate agency policy because of the MSPB. This
suggests that the MSPB has served as a bulwark against agency removal attempts to remove ALJs who do not always rule in favor of
the agency.
B. Changing the Good Cause Standard
Writing in support of Lucia, the SG argued that the government
would avoid the removal problem by having the Court construe
107
“good cause” in the APA to include when the ALJ has engaged in
personal “misconduct” or has failed “to follow lawful agency direc108
tives or to perform his duties adequately.” The SG argued that
without this authority, the President could not “properly supervise
109
those who exercise executive authority.” While more than one layer of tenure protection would still be in place, the government argued that it would comport with the President’s constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the laws and “safeguard the President’s
110
power to control and supervise the Executive Branch.”
The SG urged the Supreme Court to expand the definition of
“good cause” removal to include the ability to remove an ALJ that is

104. James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1191, 1222 n.150 (2006); see also Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners Lucia at 52–
54, Lucia v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 238 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (describing instances
in which the MSPB has not supported agency’s push for ALJ removal).
105. Moliterno, supra note 104, at 1222 n.150.
106. Brief for the Respondent SEC Supporting Petitioners at 46–48, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S.
Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (merits brief).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2018).
108. Brief for the Respondent SEC Supporting Petitioners at 13, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct.
2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (merits brief).
109. Id. at 48.
110. Id. at 45.
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111

not following the agency’s vision. If adopted, agencies would be
able to remove ALJs who “refuse[d] to follow agency policies and
procedures, who frustrate[d] the proper administration of adjudicatory proceedings, or who demonstrate[d] deficient job perfor112
mance.” Removal would occur only after the MSPB has determined that factual evidence exists to support the agency’s “prof113
“proffered, good-faith grounds.” The government contended that
these changes would give agencies and the executive branch enough
114
supervisory powers over ALJs.
Such a change would be a radical departure from the current
practice in which the MSPB determines the facts, whether those
facts amount to “good cause,” and whether the violations warrant
115
removal or other sanctions. The government’s proposal would
change this to allow agencies to determine the appropriate sanctions for ALJs, while the MSPB would only opine as to whether there
was a violation, not if the violation counted as “good cause.” 116 This
low standard of proof, along with the agency’s ability to determine
the sanction, would make the MSPB into “little more than a rubber
stamp” for the agency’s decisions. 117
C. Establishing an ALJ Corps
One popular proposed remedy is to establish an ALJ corps, appointed and supervised by an existing or newly created independent
agency. 118 Under this proposal, ALJs would not hear cases from a
119
specific agency. Instead, the ALJ corps would hear cases from vari120
ous agencies. ALJs would still only be removable for cause by the
agency head of the ALJ corps, who would also be removable for

111. Id. at 50.
112. Id. at 47.
113.
Id. at 52.
114.
Id. at 45.
115. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, SG’s Brief in Lucia Could Portend the End of the ALJ Program as We
Have Known It, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 26, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/sgsbrief-in-lucia-could-portend-the-end-of-the-alj-program-as-we-have-known-it-by-jeffrey-s-lubbers/.
116. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2061 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Lubbers, supra note 112; Justice Breyer also opined in Lucia that the government’s
proposal would permit “the Commission to remove an administrative law judge with whose
judgments it disagrees—say, because the judge did not find a securities-law violation where the
Commission thought there was one, or vice versa.” 138 S. Ct. at 2061 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 94, at 123–24 (discussing support for a unified administrative trial court); Moliterno, supra note 104, at 1227–33 (explaining support for a corps of
ALJs).
119. See Kent Barnett, supra note 23, at 828.
120. See Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 568 (2001) (arguing that a corps of ALJs would promote adjudicative independence).
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121

cause. The appeal is clear; this suggestion would remove ALJs
from specific agencies, likely leading to more independence in ALJ
decision-making.
Nonetheless, this proposal comes with serious problems as it does
not address appointment or presidential supervision concerns. First,
this proposal does not resolve the two-layer protection problem on a
formalist level, nor does it functionally resolve the two layers of protection. The two tiers of protection between the ALJs and the President might be acceptable if they came with presidential supervision,
but an ALJ corps does not offer such supervision.
Moreover, implementing an ALJ corps might come with the cost
of more incorrect decisions. ALJs are generally thought to have a
certain level of expertise as they decide cases with due regard to the
specialized nature of the agency. An ALJ corps would mean rotating
ALJs from agency to agency, which would lead to less ALJ expertise.
This could lead to more biased decisions as ALJs opt to defer to the
agency that has the supposed expertise in that area of the law.
Finally, the establishment of an ALJ corps has been adopted in
many states and has been introduced in Congress during almost
122
every session. Despite the positive reception it has received on the
state level, it has gained little traction in Congress and by 1992, the
Administrative Conference of the United States recommended that
Congress should shelve the creation of an ALJ corps citing concerns
123
about expertise.
D. Providing ALJs with Article III Tenure Protections
Another proposal would provide ALJs with the same tenure protections as Article III judges. Two legal scholars have suggested that
implementing lifetime salary protection and permitting their removal only through an impeachment process would better preserve
ALJ independence. 124 Under this proposal, there would no longer be
two tiers of protection, thus resolving the Appointments Clause issue. Moreover, moving the removal power to the House of Repre-

121. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 828–29.
122. JERRY MASHAW ET AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES
AND MATERIALS 547 (7th ed. 2018).
123. See generally 2 PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 1044 (1992) (noting that each agency is governed by a “different
body of substantive law” and encounters systematically different procedural problems).
124. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 499 (1986) (arguing that providing ALJs with similar
protections to Article III judges would preserve due process).
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sentatives allows the public to hold ALJs more accountable than under the current two-tier system.
Though it resolves the formalist Free Enterprise Fund issue, this
proposal exacerbates executive branch concerns over the lack of
presidential oversight. Though agency heads can still appoint ALJs,
removal is entirely out of the executive branch’s control and placed
125
in the House of Representatives. To be sure, this proposal would
resolve due process concerns, but it would exacerbate president supervision concerns.
E. Move Appointment and Removal to Article III Courts
One of the best proposed solutions is to have Congress move the
appointment and removal of ALJs from agencies to Article III
126
courts. The D.C. Circuit would appoint ALJs with the help of OPM
and the court could discipline or remove ALJs upon the request of
the ALJs’ agencies. The Appointments Clause allows Congress to
permit “courts of law,” such as the D.C. Circuit, to appoint inferior
127
officers. Article III courts are well-suited for the task as they already perform the interbranch appointment and removal of Article
128
I bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges. Moreover, courts such
as the D.C. Circuit are already well-versed in administrative law,
129
meaning they have the expertise needed to appoint ALJs.
This solution is appealing because it neatly resolves the Appointments Clause problem while preserving ALJ independence. Agencies, as well as the President, would be able to request that the D.C.
Circuit discipline or remove an ALJ for “incompetence, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability,” which is the same
standard that governs bankruptcy judges and is a similar process to
130
the one already in place for ALJs.

125. Barnett, supra note 23, at 831.
126. Id. at 802.
127. Id. at 836–37 (arguing that the interbranch appointments of ALJs may not impede the
functioning of the judiciary or the executive branch); see U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; see e.g., Ex
Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
128. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 514 (2011).
129. See, e.g., John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92
VA. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2006) (explaining that a large share of the D.C. Circuit appeals cases
are from agency decisions). Under this proposal, ALJ candidates would go through a similar
process to the one they went through with OPM, with a preliminary examination under the
court’s auspices. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 833 (proposing a notice and comment procedure that would allow interested parties to provide comments and indicate the preferred candidate for the agency).
130.
28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2018).
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Yet, this proposal seems unlikely amid negative perceptions of
agencies. On Capitol Hill, the trend in administrative law consists of
131
attempts to assert more control in agency decision-making. For
proponents of these bills, it is necessary to load the rulemaking process with additional procedural requirements because agencies “cir132
cumvent the will of the people.” While these proposals do not focus on agency adjudication, they likewise reflect the distrust that
politicians express for relatively permanent, influential decisionmakers who operate without appropriate oversight. The reactive
nature of the Courts may not provide the level of oversight that
elected officials in the executive branch would provide.
There are also still presidential supervision concerns by moving
ALJ supervision to Article III courts as the executive branch would
lose its remaining removal powers. Moreover, the executive branch
would also lose its newfound appointment powers. Though this
proposal solves the formal problem of two layers of protection, there
is a substantial conceptual change of the role of the branches of
government as well as the executive oversight concerns presented in
Free Enterprise Fund.
IV. SOLUTION TO APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL
Though deficient, these proposals suggest widespread recognition
that the ALJ system needs reforming. Striking a balanced approach
between ALJ independence, presidential oversight, and due process for individuals appearing before an agency requires a multifaceted solution. To address ALJ appointments, this Part suggests
that Congress should pass hiring guidelines that agencies must follow when hiring ALJs, limiting the effects of President Trump’s executive order.
This Part next addresses ALJ removal. First, this Part will outline a
statutory proposal of peremptory challenges, which would allow the
President and agencies, as well as the private party, to dismiss the
ALJ hearing the case without cause. Next, this Part will explain why
this proposal resolves constitutional issues and provides a proper
balance between ALJ impartiality and executive supervision. Finally,
Part IV examines possible consequences that would come from introducing peremptory challenges and how policies can mitigate
131. The Separation of Powers Restoration Act, the Regulatory Accountability Act, the
Regulations Endanger Democracy Act, and the Regulations from the Executive in Need of
Scrutiny Act are just a few examples.
132. Nicole Duran, Rep. John Ratcliffe: Fighting the ‘Fourth Branch of Government’, WASH.
EXAMINER (Jan. 23, 2017) (quoting Rep. John Ratcliffe), https://www.washington
examiner.com/rep-john-ratcliffe-fighting-the-fourth-branch-of-government.
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those concerns. Peremptory challenges offer a significant thumb on
the scale for the Court to allow a carveout to keep ALJ protections.
A. Defining an Officer for Appointment
The first problem that arises from Lucia is how lower courts will
apply the decision in future cases to determine whether an agency
staff member is an “Officer of the United States.” 133 For agency employees, it no longer appears essential that they have final decisional
authority to qualify as an officer. If designated as officers, this would
take them out of the competitive service and move them into excepted service. As discussed earlier, the fear is that the more influence the agency has in selecting its employees, the greater chance
that agencies exhibit bias toward ALJs.
Though this problem seems big, it is one that could be relatively
easy to solve. Throughout all stages of litigation in Lucia, the discussion centered around the distinction between adversarial and non134
adversarial adjudication. Congress can use this distinction to pass
legislation that exempts from officer status any employee who works
in a non-adversarial role. This rule would then classify administrative
judges and other employees who oversee adjudication as “Officers.”
For non-ALJ adjudicators, their classification as “inferior officers”
would be more of a formal distinction than a functional one; the only thing that would change is the appointment process. Department
heads could always appoint adjudicators of their choosing without
worrying about the statutory restrictions that apply to ALJs. Therefore, requiring department heads to appoint non-ALJ adjudicators
such as AJs does not increase the agency’s power to control adjudication. Agency staff will likely continue to make tentative selections
and the department heads will sign off on them.
To limit the selection of underqualified ALJs, Congress could also
pass a law that requires agencies to implement hiring standards akin
135
to those of the OPM. Shortly after President Trump’s executive
order, senators introduced a bipartisan bill to restore ALJs to the

133. See supra Part II. A.
134. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Lucia v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 2044
(No.
17-130),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
2017/17-130_1p23.pdf (“[O]ur submission is limited to ALJs who decide adversarial proceedings subject to . . . the APA.”).
135. See Mascott, supra note 70, at 454. This would be well within Congress’ powers as
courts have allowed Congress to impose limits on the scope of the power of appointment by
qualifying it in various ways; Mitchell A. Sollenberger, Statutory Qualifications on Appointments:
Congressional and Constitutional Choices, 34 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 202 (2010).
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136

competitive service. Though it has not passed yet, it suggests there
is a recognition of the problem that Lucia and the executive order
created. Such a solution would still allow agencies to have control
over the hiring process while mitigating the concern that agencies
are hiring unqualified adjudicators.
B. At-Will Removal of ALJs with Peremptory Challenges in a Hearing
Lucia’s larger problem is the constitutional issues with the twolayers of removal protection. To remedy this, this Note proposes that
Congress implement a system which allows the private party in a
proceeding, along with the agency and President, to have a peremptory challenge to remove the ALJ presiding over its case. Section B
first examines the peremptory challenge system that some states
have adopted and how a legislature could use its success to implement a similar system in adjudicative proceedings. Next, this Section
shows how this proposal resolves constitutional concerns of presidential supervision while balancing impartiality and due process
concerns. This Section then explores how litigants have abused the
system on the state level and how Congress could mitigate those
abuses on the administrative level. Finally, this Sections suggests how
the Court could shape discussions on removal for future decisions.
This proposal may gain more traction as it addresses the concerns of
both agencies and private parties.
1. Mechanics of a Peremptory Challenge System
Peremptory challenges are most commonly known as the ability
for a party, in either a civil or criminal case, to strike a potential juror. The challenge is “peremptory” because it requires no reason for
its use. 137 Peremptory challenges are not limited to juries. Currently,
there are eighteen states that allow litigants to remove a judge from
a case for any reason. 138 For states, standard disqualification proce-

136. A Bill to Restore Administrative Law Judges to the Competitive Service, S. 3387, 115th
Cong. (2018). Senator Cantwell [WA] reintroduced the bill in August 2019. ALJ Competitive
Service Restoration Act, S. 2348, 116th Cong. (2019).
137. There has been much discussion on the use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors and whether the system should be abolished because they frequently undermine the balance of representation on a jury. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80–81 (1986) (concluding that the use of peremptory challenges to remove persons from a cognizable group is
unconstitutional).
138. See Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates, A.B.A. REP. 107 (Aug. 8–9. 2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_107.pdf.
See
generally RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
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dures failed to provide effective relief for parties. States have found
that introducing peremptory challenges has given litigants more of
an opportunity to “improve the quality of trial court judging.” 139 Attorneys in those states have largely welcomed the introduction of
these challenges as enhancing access to justice. 140 State success with
the system leads to some hope that it could be implemented in the
administrative setting.
There is additional evidence to suggest that Congress could pass
peremptory challenge reform. Already on the federal level, 28
U.S.C. § 144 appeared to dictate peremptory disqualification for
charges of personal bias or prejudice in federal courts. Because the
Supreme Court has read in a requirement of “fair support” for all
141
charges, public policy groups in recent years have advocated for a
peremptory challenge system to be implemented on the federal lev142
el. Many public policy groups favor peremptory challenges because they provide one of the easiest ways to combat impartiality and
addresses political concerns. For conservatives, peremptory challenges prevent agency power from going unchecked. Liberals can
similarly appreciate the check on agency power, and also perceive
peremptory challenges to preserve due process for private individuals.
As noted with the proposals above, congressional support may be
difficult for any administrative reform in this political climate. Re-

JUDGES ch. 26 (2d ed. 2007); ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (2002); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(C); ARIZ. R.
CRIM. P. 10.2; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 170.6 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-805 (2003), available at http://data.opi.state.mt.us/bills/mca/3/l/3-1-805.htm; MO. R. CIV. P. 51.05; N.M. R.
CIV. P. 1-088.1; N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-106; NEV. SUP. CT. R. 48.1; OR. REV. STAT. § 14.260 (2003);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.20 (1998) (applying to criminal cases only); WYO. R. CIV. P. 40.1(b). California also allows state ALJs to be removed via peremptory challenge, provided the challenge is
before a hearing or the commencement of a prehearing conference. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, §
551.12 (2018).
139. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Judicial Peremptory Challenges as Access Enhancers, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2263, 2270 (2018).
140. See id. at 2274 (citing FLAMM, supra note 135, at 754–56).
141. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33–34 (1921). Critics have argued that the language and intent of § 144 allowed for peremptory disqualification of judges. See, e.g., Debra
Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1224
(2002); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 629 (1947). There has been
subsequent federal legislation introduced allowing parties to peremptorily challenge federal
judges, but none have passed. See, e.g., H.R. 3125, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 1649, 97th Cong.
(1981).
142. Among groups that have pushed for judicial reform, the Brennan Center for Justice
has emerged as perhaps the strongest consistent voice. Most of its efforts have focused on
judicial accountability and facilitating disqualification more easily in cases where there are
concerns about judicial impartiality. Peremptory challenges are a way to achieve those goals
and could mean support from those groups. See, e.g., Deborah Goldberg et al, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503 (2007); MATTHEW
MENENDEZ & DOROTHY SAMUELS, JUDICIAL RECUSAL REFORM: TOWARD INDEPENDENT
CONSIDERATION OF DISQUALIFICATION, (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/2019-08/Report_Judicial_Recusal_Reform.pdf.
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cent administrative reform has largely come as a result of strong
lobbying groups which gives ALJ reform some hope. For example, in
2000, Congress adopted the Information Quality Act which allowed
people and companies to petition an agency to obtain correction of
information they believe to be inaccurate. This reform was only a
143
two-sentence rider in a spending bill by an industry lobbyist.
Following Lucia, Congress initiated a bill to restore ALJs to the
144
competitive service and ensure their independence. A joint statement behind the bill was to “protect[] the due process rights of the
145
American people.” While due process concerns are surely a motivating interest for Congress, corporations also have a pecuniary interest as they often serve as private parties in agency adjudication. It
would be unsurprising if corporate interest in the agency process is
why ALJ removal reform passes.
The peremptory challenge system would work as follows: The
chief ALJ would provide the name of the administrative law judge
assigned to the proceeding along with the order of time and place
of the hearing. Both the private party as well as the agency or President would be able to remove the assigned ALJ, provided that the
party filed the challenge within fourteen days after the initial as146
signment of the case. Once a party removed the ALJ, the chief ALJ
would assign a new ALJ to hear the case. The other party would then
be able to remove the newly assigned ALJ if it files its challenge no
later than fourteen days from the date of the notice identifying the
subsequent ALJ. If a party fails to file a peremptory challenge within
the time limit, then the chief ALJ would not grant its challenge.
Once both sides in the hearing have used their peremptory challenges, the selected ALJ would hear the case, unless one of the parties removes the ALJ for cause.

143. Pub. L. No. 106–554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (H.R. 5658 incorporated by reference into H.R. 4577). Another example of strong lobby groups and administrative reform
came in 2012 when Congress altered how the Veterans Administration would adjudicate certain claims. Among the changes, the legislation requires the MSPB to hear an appeal within
twenty-one days. See Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113–146, § 707, 128 Stat. 1754, 1798–99 (Aug. 7, 2014).
144. H.R. Res. 2429, 116th Cong. (2019).
145. Bipartisan Group Introduces Legislation to Ensure the Integrity and Independence of Administrative Law Judges, GERRY CONNOLLY (May 1, 2019), https://connolly.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3627.
146. Some states require a party to file an affidavit asserting the party’s belief that the judge
cannot conduct a fair trial. Often, the affiant does not need to state the facts underlying their
claim. Other states do not require an affidavit and only require a filing to be made to remove
the judge. Under this proposal, there would only need to be a filing with no affidavit required.
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2. Peremptory Challenges Resolve Competing
Constitutional Concerns
Because peremptory challenges substantially mitigate concerns
related to oversight, independence, and impartiality, there is significant justification behind implementing the system. Allowing agencies and private parties to remove an ALJ from a hearing provides a
proper balance of executive supervision and ALJ impartiality, albeit
in an unconventional way.
a. Challenges Increase Executive Oversight
With the ability for the President or agency to remove an ALJ that
is inconsistently applying agency policy, the President gains oversight powers, a major concern of the Court in Free Enterprise Fund
and Lucia. Executive oversight was also a major concern for the government in Lucia, as the SG opined in his brief that there are often
enough facts to show ALJ wrongdoing, but the MSPB rarely issues
sanctions against ALJs. 147 Though there are still two layers of removal
protection, this does not appear to be problematic for the executive
148
branch which itself proposed keeping two layers of protection.
This suggests that the two layers of protection are not a problem
themselves, but rather the problem is that the two layers prevent the
President from being able to properly oversee his officers.
Peremptory challenges provide executive oversight by allowing
the President and agencies to remove ALJs they feel are incorrectly
applying agency policy. States that have implemented the peremptory challenge system have extolled its value in correcting judicial behavior. Appearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
John Paul Frank collected letters from nine chief justices of states
149
that allow peremptory challenges. Of those nine, eight wrote letters expressing support for the system. Justice Fred C. Struckmeyer,
Jr. of Arizona wrote that the system provides valuable information
for judges because “when a judge is disqualified for bias or prejudice, it gives him reason to examine his personal idiosyncrasies and
attitudes. Disqualification has a salutatory effect upon a judge since
150
it tends to restrain arbitrariness and intolerance.” Consistent re-

147. See Brief for the Respondent SEC Supporting Petitioners at 46, Lucia v. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130) (merits brief); supra Part III(A)(1).
148. See supra Part III, Section B.
149. See Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcommittee on Improvement in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 63. (1973) [hereinafter Judicial Machinery
Hearings].
150. Id. at 66.
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moval from cases provides ALJs feedback and allows them the opportunity to adjust their decision-making. 151 Agencies and the President benefit as they no longer need to go through the formal removal process each time they want to discipline an ALJ, while the
ALJs are still protected from agency overreach.152
b. Challenges Preserve Due Process
Many of the proposals discussed above remedy presidential supervision concerns but do nothing to address due process concerns associated with ALJ independence. The difficulty is that “[s]upervision
is merely the flipside to independence.” 153 If the President’s supervision increases, there should be a similar, inverse impact on ALJ independence. Peremptory challenges offer a unique way to provide
for presidential oversight while offering due process for private parties.
While under the current system a litigant is entitled to a new trial
if they can establish an ALJ’s prejudice, 154 prejudice is difficult to
prove. Moreover, even if a litigant proves prejudice, the post-trial
remedy of allowing re-litigation before a different ALJ is both wasteful of judicial time and unfair to the litigant.
Under a peremptory challenge system, private parties would be
able to remove an impartial ALJ before the hearing takes place. Justice Struckmeyer, Jr. wrote that peremptory challenges provided a
litigant “the feeling that he will get at least an even break in the
courtroom and the proceeding, therefore, takes on for him the ap155
pearance of justice.” With this system, private parties will feel more
confident that the executive branch has less control over the ALJ’s
decision as they can remove any given ALJ. Of course, litigants
would still be able raise the issue of prejudice if the ALJ that hears
the case is biased.
c. Challenges Improve Executive Branch Functioning
While the executive branch’s formal removal power would remain
the same, its functional removal power would expand through its

151. See ALAN J. CHASET, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 34 (1981).
152. Even ALJs who are consistently removed by the agency will hear cases because they
could always be the selected ALJ following the agency’s removal of a previous ALJ.
153. Barnett, supra note 23, at 826.
154. 20 C.F.R. § 404.940 (2018).
155. See Judicial Machinery Hearings, supra note 146, at 66.
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ability to remove ALJs from cases. Agencies would be able to
achieve efficiency in the adjudicative system by avoiding the need
to carry out removal proceedings in order to censure ALJs. Moreover, if ALJs adjust their behavior as a result of frequent removals,
agencies will be able to implement their policy more easily as they
will not have to divert agency time and resources toward ALJ discipline.
Though Free Enterprise Fund stood for the proposition that the
President should be able to oversee his executive officers, ALJs are
unique because removal is not necessarily needed to protect the policy goals of the executive branch; agencies can always appeal ALJ
decisions to the agency head and have them overturned. 156 If ALJ
hiring shifts from the OPM to agencies, agencies will be able to exert
more control by selecting ALJs who will advance the agency’s policy
goals, provided that the selection is congruous with statutory guidelines established by Congress. Finally, agencies could still initiate forcause removal if an ALJ continues to not follow agency policies.
Though the executive branch’s formal removal power would remain
unchanged, peremptory challenges would provide enough supervisory powers to ensure the central functioning of the executive
branch.
3. Potential Challenges of a Peremptory System
Implementing judicial challenges for ALJs may raise some concern regarding administrability and judicial integrity due if perceived as a radical change to the current adjudicatory system.
Though the system is a change in the context of ALJs, it is not a radical proposal as one-third of states already have the system in place.
While there may be consequences from implementing peremptory
challenges for ALJs, the states’ experience will be instructive on the
administrative level and how to mitigate some of the concerns.
Moreover, distinct aspects of administrative law may also beget different results due to the expertise of agencies.

156. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (“On appeal from or review of the [ALJ’s] initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as
it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”); see also Universal Camera Corp v. Nat. Labor Relations
Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 493–97 (1951) (explaining that the APA allows for agencies to review an ALJ
decision and decline adopting the ALJ decision if substantial evidence exists for an agency’s
contrary decision).
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a. Administrative Inefficiencies
One possible concern over implementing a peremptory challenge
system is that it could impose undue administrative burdens on judicial resources. The fear is that a party would make a challenge after
an ALJ has invested valuable time becoming familiar with the facts
157
and legal issues presented. Critics often complain about the inefficiency of the administrative state, and by allowing parties to remove
the ALJ, there is fear that little or no judicial activity would take
place until the challenge date for both sides had passed.
Though a twenty-eight-day delay certainly could mean longer wait
times, the administrative inefficiencies will be minimal. The fourteen-day deadline for each party is specifically in place for judicial
economy.158 Since most ALJ offices are small, transferring a case
159
would be a matter of moving paperwork down the hall. Even for
larger agencies such as the Social Security Administration (SSA)
where over 1,600 ALJs work, the peremptory challenges would func160
tion on an office-to-office basis to the extent possible. Therefore,
an ALJ removed in the Chicago SSA office would have the case
transferred to another SSA ALJ in Chicago. Finally, though the
length of time it takes to appear before an ALJ varies from agency to
agency, the process typically lasts over a year. 161 For an individual
who is deprived of his or her rights or entitlements, that additional
wait period is small in the grand scheme of adjudication.
There may also be concern about parties abusing the peremptory
challenge system. For the private party that may have its rights taken
away, there is an obvious incentive to delay the administrative process. 162 Available data on the use of peremptory challenges over a
fourteen-year period in Oregon, found that defendants were more
likely to use peremptory challenges than prosecutors, filing sixty-one
157. See, e.g., TERESA WHITE CARNS, ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
TO JUDGES: SURVEY OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS 10–15 (1983) (examining states’ efforts to deal
with administrative problems caused by judicial peremptory challenges).
158. Most states that have peremptory challenges of judges also have a deadline that requires a party to use the challenge within a certain time after judicial assignment. See, e.g., WIS.
STAT. § 971.20(3)(b) (1996) (request to substitute judge must be filed at least five days before
the preliminary examination).
159. See OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGT., ALJS BY AGENCY, https://www.opm.gov/services-foragencies/administrative-law-judges/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2020) (tallying ALJs by federal agency).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., AVERAGE WAIT TIME UNTIL HEARING HELD REPORT (FOR
THE MONTH OF DECEMBER 2019), https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/01_NetStat_
Report.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
162. For example, in Lucia, Lucia challenged the appointment of his ALJ and did not
actually challenge the merits of his case. Most likely, the reappointed ALJ will rule against
Lucia, but he has bought himself some time to continue to practice and get his finances in
order.
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163

percent of the challenges in criminal cases. Widespread abuse of
peremptory challenges could certainly clog the administrative state’s
machinery.
Other data suggests, however, that parties use peremptory challenges sparingly. 164 That same Oregon study that showed defendants
used the majority of peremptory challenges also found that peremptory challenges were used in less than one percent of all cases. 165 A
study in New Mexico similarly found that parties used peremptory
challenges in less than five percent of cases. 166 The infrequent use of
peremptory challenges on the state level, even in criminal cases in
which a person’s freedom is at stake, suggests they may also be sparingly used in agency adjudication.
b. Judge Shopping
Another possible consequence of a peremptory challenge system
is judge shopping—the idea that the agency or private party would
be able to pick the ALJ hearing its case. In California, a questionnaire sent out to judges found that of the abuses in the peremptory
challenge system, forty-five percent of judges mentioned judge
shopping. 167 The potential for abuse is greater in agencies that only
have one or two ALJs on staff, as the challenge could essentially
guarantee the appearance of a specific ALJ. One concern is that
agencies would remove ALJs that the current administration did not
appoint to ensure that the ALJ hearing the case has the same policy
goals as the administration. Another concern is that agencies would
excessively use the challenges against an ALJ who departs from
agency policy as a form of censure.
Critics of peremptory challenges are mistaken in their belief that
168
the challenges will lead to judge shopping. Due to random assignments, peremptory challenges mean that the judge ultimately
hearing the case will not be selected at the whim of any party. Ra-

163. ALAN J. CHASET, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 30 (1981).
164. See id. at 27, 35–36 (finding that between 1955 and 1968 in Oregon, only 1,392 challenges were made from more than one-quarter of a million cases filed. Moreover, in New Mexico, during 1979, there were “2,199 disqualifications in 53,517 cases filed.”).
165. Id. at 27.
166. See id. at 36.
167. Admin. Off. Of the [California] Courts, Report and Recommendation Concerning
Peremptory Challenge of Judges—C. C. P. § 170.6 (1969) (noting that most judges felt that
parties did not abuse the peremptory challenge procedure).
168. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for Venue: The Need for More Limits, 50 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 267, 295–98 (1996) (describing efforts by litigants to circumvent random assignment systems).
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ther, the chief ALJ will randomly assign a judge from the pool of
available ALJs. Here too, available state data suggests that critics’
fear of abuse may be overblown. Of all the peremptory challenges
filed in California, 15.6 percent were filed in courts with one or two
judges. 169 In Oregon, one-judge districts had 19.3 percent of the cas170
es filed and 22.3 percent of the peremptory challenges. These statistics suggest that challenges are not being disproportionately used
in smaller courts where there would be a greater risk of judge shopping.
To further prevent potential abuse in agencies with only one or
two ALJs on staff, Congress could put in a provision that would allow
for an ALJ from a similar agency to adjudicate a case. For example,
since the Federal Trade Commission only employs one ALJ, they
could use an ALJ from the International Trade Commission which
171
has six ALJs. The similar nature of the agencies would allow the
sharing of ALJs as envisioned with the creation of an ALJ corps, but
on a much smaller scale so that ALJs are able to maintain their subject-matter expertise.
Moreover, the small number of ALJs on staff cuts the other way in
that parties may not use challenges recklessly. 172 Both parties would
have to calculate the danger that the new judge assigned to their
hearing would be worse for their case. For both sides then, they are
unlikely to use the judicial challenges in an automatic or reckless
manner.
Finally, concerns about using peremptory challenges to target
specific ALJs may also be a feature of the system rather than a bug.
In Nevada, of the 433 judicial peremptory challenges used, 117 were
173
directed at a single judge of the eighteen-judge bench. The second-most-challenged judge was removed sixty-eight times and the
174
third-most-challenged fifty-five times. With more than half of the
challenges used on only three judges, the reality is that most judges
175
were rarely removed from a case. These statistics suggest that the
judges who were most frequently removed were removed for rea-

169. ALAN J. CHASET, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES BY
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 31 (1981) (citing JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., NINETEENTH BIENNIAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 34–39 (1963)) (reporting that there were
738 peremptory challenges in the state’s trial courts over a six-month period in 1962, of which
623 were in courts with three or more judges).
170. Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias—Common Law Evolution, Current Status, and
the Oregon Experience, 48 OR. L. REV. 311, 392 (1969).
171. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGT., ALJS BY AGENCY, https://www.opm.gov/services-foragencies/administrative-law-judges/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).
172. See id.
173. Glenn Puit, In the Courts: Scores of Litigants Bump Walsh, L.V. REV. J. Feb. 29, 2004 at IB.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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sons that were not ideological, but rather reasons related to their
abilities or tendencies as adjudicators. For agencies, having a flexible system to provide indirect feedback to ALJs is more efficient
than bringing claims to the MSPB every time an ALJ misapplies
agency policy.
c. Multiple Parties in a Single Hearing
One final possible concern with a peremptory challenge system is
how to distribute the challenges when there are multiple parties in a
case. In these instances, the chief ALJ needs to administer the peremptory challenge with sensitivity to fairness to the parties, while also avoiding the potential strategic advantages that multiple parties
on the same side could have by exercising separate challenges. State
courts have addressed this problem by allowing parties who are
176
aligned in interest to have only one peremptory challenge. For
administrative hearings, allowing each side only one such challenge
would minimize the inefficiencies present.
4. Carving Out an Exception to Free Enterprise Fund
Given the Supreme Court’s and Congress’ desire to provide accountability to agencies and to not hamper the President’s power,
the introduction of a peremptory challenge system seems to provide
an adequate remedy. Under this proposal, the current dual-layer
protection separating ALJs from the President would remain in
place which would require the Supreme Court to carve out an exception for ALJs from Free Enterprise Fund’s holding.
Central to Free Enterprise Fund and Lucia is presidential control and
the President’s ability to oversee his officers. When hearing Lucia en
banc, Judge Kavanaugh’s concerns were the individual liberty
wielded by agencies and the diminishment of the President’s pow177
er to exercise influence. Earlier in Free Enterprise Fund, the decision focused on how the removal protections had “impaired” the
President’s necessary authority to “hold his subordinates accountable for their conduct” and “subvert[ed] the President’s ability to
178
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.”

176.
rule).
177.
178.

CHASET, supra note 160, at 24–25 (describing states that have a one challenge per side
Lucia, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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Peremptory challenges properly address the Court’s concerns
around presidential control. The President can properly supervise
his officers while the history and intent around the APA remain intact. Such a solution provides an avenue for the Court to avoid going
against long-standing administrative practices. If taken seriously, the
removal of ALJ protections would undo most of the work of ALJs as
they make decisions in furtherance of agency policies. Because most
people want to avoid that result, the peremptory challenge provision
would provide a thumb on the scale for the Court to keep the removal protections.
The Court could also use future decisions to limit the scope of the
removal power and focus on whether the removal protections impair the President’s power to execute law. Back in Free Enterprise
Fund, Justice Breyer put forth six criteria that lower courts could use
as guidance on the removal question:
(1) whether the agency consists of a multimember commission; (2) whether its members are required, by statute, to
be bipartisan (or nonpartisan); (3) whether eligibility to
serve as the agency’s head depends on statutorily defined
qualifications; (4) whether the agency has independence in
submitting budgetary and other proposals to Congress
(thereby bypassing the Office of Management and Budget);
(5) whether the agency has authority to appear in court independent of the Department of Justice, cf. 28 U. S. C.
§§516–519; and (6) whether the agency is explicitly classi179
fied as “independent” by statute.
The Court could use Breyer’s factors to find that quasi-judicial inferior officers like ALJs can be subject to removal restrictions. This is
in line with modern separation of powers law which allows limited
restrictions to be placed on the government when it does not re180
quire significant departures from existing practices. Since ALJs
were created to deliver judicially comparable, trial-type justice, maintaining their protections is imperative to prevent them from becoming biased decisionmakers for the executive branch.

179. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180. See Michael B. Rappaport, Classical Liberal Administrative Law in a Progressive World, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 105 (M. Todd Henderson, ed., 2018).
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CONCLUSION
Despite Lucia’s narrowness, the decision has already affected administrative law. Over the next years, it will be intriguing to watch
the litigation filed to address the questions left open by the Court,
including the removal protections. As discussed in this note, the issue is especially tricky because of the Court’s mealy-mouthed approach to the President’s removal power.
This Note has proposed a modest solution that balances the President’s interest in supervising his officers while maintaining the decisional independence of ALJs. Congress provided ALJs with forcause removal protections to ensure their independence and preserve the high quality of government service. Implementing peremptory challenges would be a way to maintain ALJs’ quality while
improving accountability and transparency in the administrative
state. This system would provide private litigants meaningful access
to their hearings as they would have a mechanism to avoid problematic ALJs who may kill their claim.

